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Building on a class of transcendental preferences for luxury, explicit solutions for price 
taking behaviour and exchange equilibrium are discussed, which share the analytical 
tractability of Cobb-Douglas models. Such economies display fundamental positive 
properties, among which uniqueness and price tâtonnement stability of equilibrium. The 
monotone comparative statics of the luxury effect is discussed. Pareto sets admit a 
simple characterization, which generalizes the one set forth by Afriat (1987) so that a 
richer phenomenology is embraced. Potential lines of progress are envisaged. 
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1   Introduction 
The theoretical analysis of general equilibrium, on both positive and normative grounds, has 
long been recognized as the structural problem of economic theory, and in fact as a cogent 
representation of the decentralized mechanisms supporting the working of Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand” for competitive market economies. That being the case, “the equations of 
equilibrium constitute the center of our discipline” (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 620), and the 
relevance follows of having explicit solutions to such equations. In such respects, the 
solutions for pure exchange economies with Cobb-Douglas (CD) agents discussed by Afriat 
(1987) represent a landmark. It is the aim of the present contribution to set forth a class of 
explicit solutions for Walrasian demand and exchange equilibrium with two agents, built on 
transcendental utility functions over a pair of commodities, which contains the solutions for 
CD agents, and shares the nice properties of such models, in first instance, uniqueness and 
(price tâtonnement) stability of equilibrium, together with the pleasant analytical tractability 
which justifies to a large extent the pervasiveness of the CD analytic form, “perhaps the most 
ubiquitous function in all of economics” (Chambers, 1988). We shall employ the Edgeworth 
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box as playground for our analysis of exchange equilibrium, on account of the generality of 
the insights which can be thereby conveyed.1 
The vision underlying the present contribution posits that the luxury-necessity dichotomy 
represents quite general a trait of preferences with respect to the benchmark case of 
homothetic preferences, in which income (wealth) effects display scale symmetry. Expansion 
paths of homothetic consumers are rays, so that the relative composition of optimal 
consumption bundles is unaffected by income effects. With respect to such a benchmark 
framework, the luxury-necessity dichotomy posits an elementary grain of generality, namely, 
expansion paths bending (globally) towards luxury, and maintaining the normality of both 
(possibly, aggregates of) goods. In such respects, our model of transcendental preferences 
provides a highly tractable representation of the luxury-necessity dichotomy with asymptotic 
satiation of necessity, i.e. vanishing necessity share in the large expenditure limit. 
The benchmark nature of homothetic2 models has long been recognized, with CD models 
representing, in many senses, an ideal3 setting. One is led to envision a theoretical ‘hierarchy’ 
in the space of preferences, such that homothetic models stand out, among which CD models 
represent a preferred setting. Definitely, in between the homothetic CD benchmark and the 
general problem, we shall discuss the well behaviour of a class of preferences for luxury, 
which combine the analytical tractability of CD models with a significant degree of 
generality. Noticeably, the parameterization of our preferences enables one to identify a 
monotone “luxury effect”, which one can address in terms of monotone comparative statics, 
along the lines tailored by Milgrom and Shannon (1994). In addition, the explicit solution for 
Pareto sets enables one to envision a phenomenology which generalizes the one set forth by 
Afriat (1987). 
Beyond the relevance of our demand functions for empirical analysis (“specific functional 
forms for aggregate demand relationships are the starting point for a large body of empirical 
work”; Sonnenshein, 1972), our model strikes a definite perspective on the positive theory of 
general equilibrium (PTGE). Recall, the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem (see Mas-
                                                 
1  As Mas-Colell et al. (1995) put it, “There are virtually no phenomena or properties of general 
equilibrium exchange economies that cannot be depicted in it” (ivi, p. 521). The introduction of the 
Edgeworth box can be attributed to Pareto (Binmore, 2007). 
2 According to Chambers and Mitchell (2001), “Homotheticity may be the most common functional 
restriction employed in economics.” See Mantovi (2013a, 2013b) for a differential geometric 
approach to the benchmark scale invariance of homothetic problems. Scale invariance lies at the 
basis, for instance, of the invariance problem of index numbers, for which Samuelson and Swamy 
(1974) set forth a landmark analysis. 
3  Consider for instance the fundamental role of CD functions in the class of self-dual (utility or 
production) functions (Sato, 1976; 1981). In addition, consider the rationale for introducing super 
Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions (Mas-Colell, 1991), which enrol for instance CES 
functions with elasticity of substitution coefficient geq 1. For application of the CD functional form 
as matching function, see Silva and Toledo (2013) and references therein.   
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Colell et al., 1995, and references therein) establishes that, as for excess demand, “anything 
goes”: given an acceptable aggregate excess demand function (i.e. which satisfies continuity, 
homogeneity of degree 0 and Walras law), there exist individual excess demand functions 
from which the aggregate function can be derived. 4  As a consequence, the theoretical 
relevance is by now undisputed of establishing significant lines along which to introduce 
structure on excess demand. For instance, Quah (2003) exploits the normality of goods in the 
comparative statics of general equilibrium. Definitely, we shall employ the luxury-necessity 
dichotomy in order to put structure on Marshallian and excess demand functions via the 
parameterization of transcendental utility functions. 
Freixas and Mas-Colell (1987) establish the relevance of the “uniform curvature” 
condition for the validity of the weak axiom of revealed preference (Samuelson, 1938; 
“WARP”) for aggregate demand. “With normal goods an interpretation is that commodities 
admit the same classification as necessities or luxuries at any level of admissible income” (ivi, 
p. 516). True, the Authors allow such a classification to be price dependent, so that a 
commodity may be a luxury at a given price vector, and a necessity at another. Definitely, our 
explicit solutions for price taking behaviour and equilibrium provide a transparent realization 
of the setting discussed by Freixas and Mas-Colell (1987), with no restriction concerning the 
distribution of income.5 Evidently, our approach is ‘orthogonal’ to the geometric approaches 
to PTGE (see for instance the classical contribution by Debreu, 1976, and the recent survey 
by Balasko and Tvede, 2010), in that the precise (flexible) functional form of our preferences 
is crucial for the following arguments. 
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we define our exchange 
economies. In section 3 we represent price taking behaviour and characterize equilibrium, and 
then sketch the positive relevance of the results. In section 4 we establish the monotone 
comparative statics of the luxury effect. In section 5 we characterize the Pareto sets of our 
economies. A final section envisions potential lines of progress. The Appendix collects a 
number of plots meant to sharpen intuition about the results established in the main text. 
2    A Class of Exchange Economies 
Consider the class of preferences represented by the ordinal utility functions 
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4 In a sense, such a result establishes the ‘completeness’ of the language of PTGE. 
5 See for instance Hildenbrand (1983) and Chiappori (1985) for the relevance of the distribution of 
income with respect to the Law of Demand. 
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over commodities x and y. The parameter a∈(0,1) generalizes the corresponding CD 
parameter, in that the functional form (1) reduces to the CD form for ε → 0. The parameter 
ε∈[0,∞) injects increasing luxury into commodity y: the functional form (1) factorizes a term 
generating a “luxury effect”, namely, F(y) = exp(ε(1–a)y), such that dF/dy is proportional to 
F, thereby enhancing the analytical tractability of the model. The relevance has been long 
established of such objective functions in production analysis as transcendental functions 
(Halter et al., 1957; Mundlak, 1964), a subclass of generalized power functions (de Janvry, 
1972). The preferences represented by (1) 6  are smooth, strongly increasing and strictly 
convex over the strictly positive quadrant, and we are thereby guaranteed that Marshallian 
demand is a function7 and that expansion paths do foliate smoothly the consumption set 
(0,∞)×(0,∞). 
Indifference curves for the preferences (1) can be represented as 
a
a
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Generalizing CD models, such curves approach asymptotically the axes, as represented in 
Figure 1 by sample curves, for a = 0.75 and ε = 0.4, which embody the “luxury effect” 
generated by ε : MRS vary smoothly along rays so that, the larger the bundle, the less luxury 
is needed to substitute8 a definite amount of necessity. 
Let us sketch the basic elements of the consumption model (Mantovi, 2013(b)) which can 
be straightforwardly translated to the exchange problem via the logic of price taking. The 
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generalize the corresponding CD condition (see for instance Varian, 1992) and 
provides a Cartesian equation for expansion paths.  
Freixas and Mas-Colell (1987) define the uniform curvature (UC) condition, according to 
which, in essence, expansion paths are required to be either concave or convex. By (3), UC is 
satisfied by our model. Needless to say, formula (3) is independent of the utility 
                                                 
6 To the author’s knowledge, such preferences have not been employed in the analysis of general 
equilibrium.  
7  Recall that, in general, Marshallian demand is a correspondence (Afriat, 1987; Mas-Colell et al., 
1995) 
8  “At the margin, all goods consumed are perfect substitutes” (Silberberg, 2008, p. 20).  
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representation; for instance, it can be obtained from the representation a lnx + (1–a) lny + (1–
a)εy  of utility, equivalent to (1).  
Figure 1 
 
Sample indifference (green) curves with utility levels 2, 4, 6 for the agent (1) 
with a = ¾ and ε = 0.4, together with expansion (red) paths for px/py = 1, 2, 5, 10. 
 
For positive ε expansion paths (hyperbolas) bend towards the luxury axis and display 
asymptotes 
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Notice, I and py enter such an expression via their ratio, so as to comply with homogeneity of 
degree 0 in prices and income. Equation (5) admits a positive solution (the relevant one) and a 
negative solution; one can check that the positive solution y*(py,I) displays income elasticity 
exceeding 1 for positive ε, and approaches the corresponding CD solution in the limit ε → 0. 
Noticeably, Marshallian demand for y does not depend on px, thereby generalizing the 
corresponding CD property of vanishing cross-price response. Then, Marshallian demand for 
x can be written 
),(),,( y
x
y
x
yx pIyp
p
p
IppIx ∗∗ −=    (6)                                            
with the proper CD limit for ε → 0, and with non-vanishing cross-price response for ε  > 0. 
We can then write the closed form solution for indirect utility ( )),(),,,(),,( ,, yyxayxa pIyIppxUIppV ∗∗=  εε . The simple analytical setting defined by 
eq. (5) guarantees the existence of explicit solutions for quantities characterizing optimal 
consumption according to (1). A correspondingly simple analytical setting for exchange can 
be setup, in which a FOC corresponding to (3) characterizes rational behaviour, and a 
quadratic equation corresponding to (5) determines Walrasian demand for commodity y. 
2.1    Exchange 
The Edgeworth box represents feasible allocations of elementary exchange economies, in 
which a pair of agents are in a position to exchange a pair of commodities over which they 
have private ownership, and whose stock we normalize to unity (c.f. Afriat, 1987), in the 
absence of other meaningful scales. Let the agents A and B belonging to the class (1) be 
identified by the values a, ε and a′, ε′ of the parameters respectively. Let (x, y) denote the 
quantities of the two commodities owned by agent A, and therefore (1–x, 1–y) those owned 
by agent B. Agents have initial endowments, which, in general, do not represent a WE. Write 
),( yx for the initial endowment of agent A. Let the necessary commodity be the numeraire, 
so as to let the relative price p define the budget line )( yypxx −−= , which represents 
bundles with the same value. Let us confine our analysis to the interior (0,1)×(0,1) of the 
Edgeworth box, in which both agents are endowed with positive amounts of both 
commodities, thereby aligning with the assumptions of the first existence theorem set forth by 
Arrow and Debreu (1954), as well as guaranteeing that our utility functions are strongly 
increasing on their domain. Such a restriction is consistent, in that the indifference curves (2), 
generalizing CD models, never hit the boundary of the consumption set (0,∞)×(0,∞). We shall 
not consider free goods. 
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The extant literature relies heavily on homothetic models in order to address WE. True, 
despite the theoretical relevance of such models, homothetic consumers cannot be taken to 
represent general traits of preferences, which in fact the luxury-necessity dichotomy 
embodied by our model (1) of preferences can accommodate, to some extent. Recall, in fact, 
the luxury-necessity dichotomy represents a fundamental partition of consumption goods in 
empirical analyses (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
Consider for instance Engel’s Law (see Chakrabarty and Hildenbrand, 2011, for a recent 
review), according to which the budget share for foodstuff is decreasing with income in the 
aggregate. Foodstuff is the typical example of necessity, for which empirical analysis has long 
established the saturation of Engel curves (see for instance Aitchison and Brown, 1954). True, 
the model (1) of preferences provides a tractable stylized fact accounting for the saturation of 
consumption of a necessary (possibly, aggregate) commodity, in connection with the 
asymptotic linearity of Engel curves for an ‘associated’ luxury (possibly, aggregate) 
commodity, and then may represent an analytical setting well suited for the analysis of 
nonbalanced growth.9 
By the nice properties of the preferences (1), namely, smoothness, strict convexity and 
strong monotonicity, we are guaranteed the existence of a WE for our economies as a 
consequence of Proposition 17.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. (1995). The same properties imply 
that a price vector is a WE price vector if and only if it is market clearing, i.e. if aggregate 
excess demand vanishes for each commodity (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 581). 
 Our analysis is confined to the utility hypothesis, “i.e., the assumption that demand is 
generated by maximizing a quasi-concave utility function” (Kihlstrom et al., 1976), and we 
are thereby guaranteed that individual excess demand functions do satisfy WARP. Definitely, 
WARP represents a strong condition on aggregate excess demand. In fact, by monotonicity of 
aggregate excess demand one can establish WARP, and then equilibrium price is unique 
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995). True, being (1) a ‘well-behaved’ generalization of CD preferences, 
our economies do satisfy WARP in the aggregate and then admit unique equilibria (section 3). 
As for the stability of equilibrium, being P the price vector, recall the definition 
)(Pz P c
dt
d
=  (c > 0) of price tâtonnement10 stability as a first order ODE defining a pull 
towards equilibrium prices: a positive (negative) k-th component of the excess demand z leads 
to increase (decrease) of the corresponding component of P; no pull occurs for vanishing z. 
One thereby pins down a pregnant stability concept, which can be connected with WARP (for 
                                                 
9 To the author’s knowledge, the functional form (1) has not been employed to model the demand side 
of nonbalanced growth, for which the Stone-Geary aggregate is typically employed (Acemoglu, 
2008).  
10 See Jaffé (1967) for a thorough discussion of the interpretations of the tâtonnement process (Walras, 
1874).   
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instance, Arrow et al., 1959; Uzawa, 1960). Definitely, our economies turn out to be stable in 
such sense. 
3   Walrasian Demand 
3.1   Parametric Representation 
By the logic of price taking, we are in a position to disentangle the optimization problems of 
our agents, and reduce to the independent offer problems of two consumers characterized by 
definite preferences and initial endowments. For each price ratio, each agent has its own best 
response (offer function) which maximizes his utility on the budget line. Such Walrasian 
demand function for agent A can be obtained from the solution to the optimization problem 
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for Walrasian demand for the luxury commodity. Such a simple equation provides a 
transparent condition for price taking behaviour, which parallels condition (5) for Marshallian 
demand. In fact, the term )( ypx + represents the initial wealth of agent A, which corresponds 
to the income/wealth parameter I in (5). Then, being p the (relative) price of the luxury 
commodity, eq. (9) can be obtained directly from eq. (5) via the substitution p
ypx
p
I
y
+
→ . 
In the CD limit ε → 0, eq. (9) reduces to 
0)(
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=+−
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and therefore admits the well-known solution 
p
ypxay +−= )1(  (for instance, Mas-Colell 
et al., 1995, p. 519), which parallels the corresponding expression 
yp
Iay )1( −=  for 
Marshallian demand (for instance, Varian, 1992, p. 111). Then, for positive ε, the positive 
solution to (9) reads 
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The corresponding solution ( ) ( )yxpypypxyxpx ,;  ,; AA ∗∗ −+=  for the other commodity is 
then uniquely determined. We thereby establish the parametric representation of the offer 
curve for agent A originating at the endowment ),( yx , for p larger or smaller than the MRS 
at ),( yx . 
For the sake of definiteness, call Adam the agent characterized by a = 0.75, ε = 0.4. Let 
his initial endowment correspond to exactly half the resources of the economy, i.e. 
)2/1,2/1( == yx    . Such a symmetric endowment stands out with respect to general 
allocations, in that it represents equality of resources for the two agents participating in the 
exchange economy. Such an allocation is a WE for infinite pairs of agents (1), as will be 
established in section 5. Still, in general, a pair of agents (1) may find it profitable to 
exchange fractions of their endowments, as manifested by the following example. 
The symmetric endowment corresponds to Adam’s utility level being approximately 
0.5256 and MRS = 2/5. The function (11) boils down to 
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We can employ such an expression in order to plot Adam’s excess demand 
( ) 5.05.0,5.0;),;( AdamAdam −= ∗ pyyxpz y  for the luxury commodity for the endowment 
)2/1,2/1( == yx    . Figure 2 (above) represents the monotone character of zy Adam; it is not 
difficult to convince oneself that the same monotonicity attains for any endowment. 
Corresponding results hold for the necessary commodity (Proposition 1 below): given (12), 
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1 ;Adam  px  can be identified via the budget line. We thereby determine the parametric 
representation of the offer curve originating at the initial endowment. For instance, for p = 
0.5, formula (12) established Adam’s excess demand for the luxury commodity as 
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∗     x , so that Adam has incentives to offer a fraction of his 
endowment of the luxury commodity in exchange of some of the necessary one, as 
represented in the upper part of Figure 2. 
The same argument can be employed in order to establish the offer curve for agent B, 
characterized by parameters a′, ε′ and initial endowment )1 ,1( yx −− . From equation (9) we 
obtain 
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by means of the substitution  y → 1 – y , whose solution parallels the functional form (11). 
Then, for the agent Bob characterized by a′ = 0.5, ε′ = 0.5, endowed with 
)2/11,2/11( ==−==− yyxx    , and therefore with utility approximately 0.566 and MRS = 
1.25, we have 
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from which we derive the excess demand represented in the lower part of Figure 2. 
Recall, an agent is said to be a net demander (or supplier) of a commodity at p if his 
Walrasian demand of that commodity at p exceeds (or is lower than) his initial endowment, 
i.e. his excess demand for the commodity is positive (or negative). Then, excess demand for a 
commodity is positive at p if both agents are net demanders, or if net demand of one agent 
exceeds net supply of the other agent. The relative price p at which net demand equals net 
supply for a commodity is a clearing relative price. As can be read off Figure 2, it turns out 
that for both Adam and Bob the initial symmetric allocation )2/1,2/1( == yx     can be 
improved upon by exchange: for p belonging to the interval (0.4,1.25) Adam is a net supplier 
of the luxury commodity, whereas Bob is a net demander, and a unique relative price 
p*∈(0.4,1.25) exists which clears both markets. 
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Figure2 
 
Above. Adam’s excess demand (12) for the luxury commodity (blue curve). The 
function vanishes for p = 0.4 (MRS at the initial endowment); the dot represents 
Adam’s offer –0.0796 at p = 1/2. The corresponding CD a = 0.75 excess 
demand (red curve) y = (1+p)/(8p) – 0.5 vanishes at p = 1/3. Below. Bob’s 
excess demand (14) for the luxury commodity (blue curve), vanishing for p = 
1.25. The corresponding CD a′ = 0.5 excess demand (red curve) y = (1+p)/(4p) 
– 0.5 vanishes at p = 1. 
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Figure 3 represents the aggregate excess demand 
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Figure3 
 
Aggregate Adam-Bob excess demand for the luxury commodity for 
p∈(0.4,1.25) for the symmetric initial allocation. The function vanishes 
approximately at 0.73. 
 
for the luxury commodity for the symmetric initial allocation, which vanishes at p* roughly 
0.73. The smooth monotonicity and convexity of the function (15) are displayed in Figure 311. 
The nice behaviour thereby represented extends for all positive p, and is not special to the 
agents and initial allocation considered. 
For general agents belonging to the class (1) and for general initial allocation, the 
aggregate excess demand for the luxury commodity 
                                                 
11 One can compare Figure 3.2 in Kehoe (1998) representing a case of nonuniqueness of equilibrium. 
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is smooth, decreasing and convex, and vanishes at the unique equilibrium relative price 
 
)0(1−∗ ≡ luxuryzp      (17) 
 
which clears both markets: needless to say, condition (17) can be formulated in terms of 
aggregate excess demand for either commodity. 
Notice, for increasing ε, the excess demand for the luxury good increases, and we are in a 
position to define a “luxury effect”. In fact for the CD agents a = 0.75 and a ′ = 0.5 with 
symmetric initial allocation (0.5, 0.5), equilibrium is attained once their Walrasian demand 
for the luxury commodity clear, i.e. 
p
p
p
p
4
11
8
1 +
−=
+ , so that equilibrium relative price 
results in p* = 3/5, and then y* = 1/3 and x* = 3/5. The corresponding equilibrium quantities for 
Adam and Bob are affected by the interplay of the luxury effects driven by ε = 0.4 and ε′ = 
0.5, so that the equilibrium relative price is higher than 3/5 (approximately 0.73), Adam ends 
up with y* > 1/3 and x* > 3/5. The luxury effect is clearly depicted in Figure 2, in which 
positive values of ε and ε′ determine upward shifts of excess demand functions. True, a 
thorough account of the monotonicity of the luxury effect can be given along the lines tailored 
by Milgrom and Shannon (1994), which we address in section 4. 
To sum up, we have gathered the elements necessary to uniquely identify a WE 
for any pair of agents (1) and for any internal initial allocation, as well as provide a 
full-fledged characterization of the well behaviour represented in formulas (11) and 
(16). 
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PROPOSITION 1. For any pair of agents belonging to the class (1), our exchange 
economies are such that both individual and aggregate excess demand functions (0,∞) 
→ R for the luxury commodity are C∞, strictly decreasing in the relative price 
x
y
p
p
p =  
and strictly convex for any endowment. Then, both individual and aggregate excess 
demand for the necessary commodity are C∞, strictly increasing and strictly concave in 
p for any endowment. 
 
 
Proof. Compute first and second derivatives of (11) and (16) with respect to p and check the 
above statement.  
 
 
We thereby establish the regularity of our economies, as well as the monotonicity of excess 
demand functions, which represents “the law of demand for any kind of (normalized) price 
change” (Mas-Colell, 1991, p. 277). Recall the definition of a regular exchange economy 
(Mas-Colell, et al., 1995) with n commodities. Choose a commodity as numeraire, and 
consider the aggregate vector excess demand ζ of the remaining commodities as function of 
the n–1 relative prices π. The economy is regular if the (n–1)×(n–1) jacobian matrix D ≡
π
ζ
∂
∂
 
is non-singular, i.e. if the differentials of the n–1 components of ζ are linearly independent 
over all relative prices. Equivalently, the definition can be given in terms of normalized prices 
belonging to the unit simplex (Kehoe, 1998). Definitely, for our economies, n – 1 = 1, and D 
reduces to the derivative of (16): thus, by our choice of the necessary commodity as 
numeraire, the regularity condition boils down to aggregate excess demand for the luxury 
commodity having positive or negative slope, i.e. not displaying a stationary point. Notice, 
existence of a stationary point is not incompatible with monotonicity of excess demand, but 
such critical economy may represent the ‘transition’ towards nonuniqueness of equilibrium 
(see Kehoe, 1998, Fig. 3.5 for a representative pattern) and more generally the fact that 
variations in relative prices may determine variations of excess demand which may not be 
arbitrarily small (i.e. inverse excess demand non uniformly continuous). On account of the 
monotonicity embodied by (16), our model maintains the well behaviour shared by CD 
agents, in particular, aggregate WARP and price tâtonnement stability are satisfied. 
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3.2   Cartesian Representation 
We have gone a long way in the characterization of our economies, and in fact provided a 
complete solution to the equilibrium problem, as well as established the nice price taking 
behaviour represented in Figure 2, 3 and Proposition 1. True, the parametric representation of 
offer curves is not the only viable approach to the analytics of price taking; the Cartesian 
representation provides a useful analytical setting as well, for instance with respect to 
graphical analysis (see Figure 4) which is an invaluable generator of insights. Definitely, 
capitalizing on the tractability of the preferences (1), we are in a position to derive response 
functions from the FOC expressing the tangency of indifference curves and budget lines, 
thereby obtaining a Cartesian representation of offer curves which does not contemplate 
prices: given price taking behaviour, the condition 
)( )1)((            )1(
1
1 xxyyyyx
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establishes the Walrasian demand of agent A. The Cartesian representation 
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(19)   
for A’s offer curve follows, with the correct limit ̅ݔ  for ݕ → ݕത. For instance, for the initial 
endowment (̅ݔ =1/2,  ݕത = 1/2) , Adam’s (a = 0.75, ε  = 0.4) offer curve admits the Cartesian 
representation 
      25.15.9
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(20) 
plotted in Figure 4. One can check that such a representation is consistent with the previously 
discussed parametric representation. Again, the simple substitution y → 1–y enables us to 
write down the Cartesian representation of the offer curve for agent B, namely, 
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(21) 
Then, for Bob (a′ = 0.5, ε ′ = 0.5) with initial endowment (1 − ̅ݔ =1/2, 1 − ݕത = 1/2), we have 
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(22) 
The unique WE for the economy defined by Adam and Bob with symmetric initial allocation 
is represented in Figure 4 at the intersection of offer curves, with y* approximately 0.32, x* 
approximately 0.64, and equilibrium relative price p* approximately 0.73 (compare Figure 3). 
We thereby obtain a transparent representation of the well behaviour of our exchange 
economies. The qualitative pattern represented in Figure 4 holds for all agents (1) and for all 
initial conditions (endowments) in the open Edgeworth box. Recall, multiplicity of 
equilibrium is connected with twisty offer curves and turning points in excess demand curves 
(in the words of Cowell, 2005), phenomena for which our economies make no room 
(Proposition 1). By means of Figure 4 we can build a solid intuition concerning the 
mechanism guaranteeing the positive properties of our equilibria, which we deepen via 
monotone comparative statics in the following section. 
Figure 4 
 
Offer curves for Adam (red) and Bob (magenta) for initial symmetric allocation 
(0.5,0.5) against indifference curves (blue: Adam, green: Bob) in the subset 
(0.4, 0.8)×(0.25, 0.55) of the Edgeworth box. The intersection of offer curves, at 
(x, y) ≈ (0.64, 0.32), identifies the unique WE allocation. Analogously regular 
patterns hold for all agents (1) and all initial allocations. 
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4   Luxury Effect 
Finally, armed with a thorough account of the positive properties of our economies, we are in 
a position to address comparative statics. By the explicit solutions for Walrasian demand 
established in the previous section, one can employ the parameterization (1) of preferences in 
order to gauge the effects driving the rational responses of agents, and then the resulting 
(unique) exchange equilibria. As a matter of fact, any parameter in a model may be taken to 
define an economic ‘effect’; true, the parameter ε in our utility functions (1) represents a 
significant monotone trait of rational behaviour, with respect to which we are in a position to 
address monotone comparative statics along the lines tailored by Milgrom and Shannon 
(1994, “MS” henceforth). 
Figure 5 
 
Expansion path  px = py  for the agents (1) with (a,ε) = (0.5,0.1; upper expansion 
path with satiation level β = 10), (0.5,0.5), (0.5,1), (0.5,5; lower expansion path 
with satiation level β = 0.2). Compare Fig. 1 in which a number of expansion 
paths are represented for the same agent. 
 
As anticipated in section 3, a luxury effect appears to drive Walrasian demand for the luxury 
commodity of agents (1) so as to produce monotone upward shifts, for any a, p and initial 
endowment, as represented in Figure 2. Such a property parallels the property of increasing 
bending of expansion paths towards the luxury axis established by formula (3); Figure 5 plots 
the expansion path  px = py  for sample values of ε at fixed a: as intuition suggests, the larger 
ε, the larger the luxury share for all values of income/wealth. 
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Correspondingly, one may ask whether an analogous monotonicity holds for the effect 
driven by a. For agents belonging to the class (1), call individual distributive effects those 
generated by a on individual price taking behaviour, and call interplay distributive effect the 
one generated by both parameters a, a′ on the equilibrium of the economy. We employ the 
term “distributive” on account of the analogy with production analysis. For instance, Fuss et 
al. (1978, ch. 4) enrol the distributive share effect among the key effects in production12. 
Interplay distributive effects have been long established as well: it is well known that 
identical CD preferences (vanishing interplay distributive effect) force a WE to lie on the 
diagonal of the Edgeworth box (for instance, Afriat, 1987). Definitely, in order to assess the 
interplay distributive effect, a determination of the Pareto set is necessary (next section). 
In order to argue about the monotonicity of such effects, let us follow MS in the setup of 
comparative statics. For any positive p and any initial endowment (̅ݔ, ݕത) ∊ (0 × 1) × (0 × 1), 
consider the budget lines ݔ = ̅ݔ − ݌(ݕ − ݕത), which can be ordered by increasing y so as to 
represent a lattice. 
  
PROPOSITION 2. For any 0>≡
x
y
p
p
p , any a∈(0,1) and any initial allocation, our 
agents display excess demand for the luxury commodity increasing with ε, and then 
excess demand for the necessary commodity decreasing with ε. Therefore aggregate 
excess demand for the luxury commodity increases with both luxury parameters ε, ε’. 
 
Proof. Consider the function yaaa eyyypxyxpayf εε )1(1))((),,,,;( −−−−=  (problem 7), 
which represents the functions (1) constrained on budget lines, and whose maximization 
yields the Walrasian demand for the luxury commodity of the agent (a,ε) for initial 
endowment )1,0()1,0(),( ×∈yx . Being a function of the single variable y∈(0,1), f is 
quasisupermodular (MS, p. 162). Being 0
2
>
∂∂
∂
εy
f
 in (0,1)×[0,∞) for any a∈(0,1), p∈(0,∞) 
and )1,0()1,0(),( ×∈yx , f has increasing differences in (y,ε) (MS, Theorem 6), and 
therefore satisfies the single crossing property (MS, p. 164). Then, by the fundamental 
monotonicity theorem (MS, Theorem 4), we are guaranteed that argmax y f increases with ε 
for any a, p, ),( yx in the proper intervals. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Compare the terminology employed by Afriat (1987) in the analysis of CD preferences, according to 
which the parameter a measures “distribution of weights” of wants (ivi, p. 327),  
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Figure A1 plots the function ݂(ݕ; ܽ, ߝ, ݌, ̅ݔ, ݕത)  for a = 0.5, )5.0,5.0(),( =yx   and sample 
values of p, and represents transparently the monotonicity of the luxury effect, which extends 
for all values of ε: the luxury effect embodied by the utility functions (1) is a robust one. 
Definitely, such a monotonicity does not hold for the individual distributive effect. Figure 
A2 plots the function f for ε = 0.5, )5.0,5.0(),( =yx and sample values of p, and displays the 
transition from a phase in which f increases with a to a phase in which f decreases with a, 
thereby ruling out the possibility of monotone individual distributive effects. Still, such effect 
does play a significant role in our economies, which can be transparently represented on 
normative grounds. 
5  Pareto sets 
The Pareto set of an exchange economy is the set of Pareto efficient allocations. The crucial 
result has long been established that any WE in an Edgeworth box with nonsatiated 
preferences belongs to the Pareto set (first welfare theorem), and interpreted as a consistent 
representation of the working of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”. Noticeably, capitalizing on 
the analytical tractability of our preferences, we are in a position to set forth explicit solutions 
for Pareto sets; as is well known, the equation for the Pareto set represents the condition of 
proportionality of the differentials (gradients) of the utility functions of the two agents.13 
 
PROPOSITION 3. The equation of the Pareto set for our exchange economies reads  
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Proof. Writing respectively UA and UB for the utility functions of the agents A, B, the 
condition dUA ∝ dUB reads 
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i.e. 
                                                 
13 Edgeworth (1881) himself pointed out the relevance of such an equation, as well as its fatherhood, 
“Professor Jevons’s equation” (ivi, p. 21).   
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from which we obtain (23). 
 
 
Formula (23) generalizes the one set forth by Afriat (1987, p. 327) for CD economies in terms 
of the “spread” )1(
)1(
aa
aaM
−
′
′
−
≡  between the “wants” of the CD agents. The simplicity of 
formula (23) witnesses the effectiveness of our model. The same limits 
      1)(~lim,0)(~lim 10 == →→ yxyx yy             (26) 
hold as for CD (and not for general) agents. It follows straightforwardly from formula (23) 
that the allocation )2/1,2/1( == yx     is a WE for any pair of agents (1) such that 
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As expected, such a condition is satisfied by identical agents. In fact, there exist many more 
pairs of agents for which (27) is satisfied, and then for which an equal initial allocation of 
resources is stable under exchange possibilities: for any given pair a, a′ ∈(0,1) there exist 
infinite nonnegative pairs ε, ε′ such that (27) is satisfied. Still, such an occurrence has 
Lebesgue measure zero in the space (0,1)×[0,∞) of our agents. 
For the sake of graphical analysis, notice that for the agents Adam and Bob formula (23) 
reads 
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whose plot is given in Figure 6, against sample indifference curves. Evidently, the linear 
approximation of the Pareto set (23) about the corners is essential for qualitative analysis. 
Definitely, the Taylor expansion of (23) about y = 0 and y = 1 is feasible, since for a, a′ 
∈(0,1) and nonnegative ε and ε′, the function (23) is C∞ in a neighbourhood of [0,1]. Notice 
in first instance that the denominator in (23) is positive at both y = 0 and y = 1. Then, suppose 
the denominator of (23) vanishes at y∈(0,1). Then, by (24), one has 
0))1(1(1 =−′+
′
′
− yy
a
a ε , which cannot occur for y∈(0,1). Then, for any a, a′,ε and ε′ in the 
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proper intervals, there exists an open neighbourhood of [0,1] in which (23) is the ratio of C∞ 
functions with nonvanishing denominator, and is therefore C∞. Thus, we are guaranteed the 
possibility to Taylor expand the function (23) about the corners, and thereby obtain 
 
LEMMA 1. The Taylor expansions of (23) about y = 0 and y = 1 result in 
     )()'1(
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aahx ++
−
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(29) 
      )()1(
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−=− ε        (30)                                             
Proof. Straightforward. 
 
Figure 6 
 
Pareto set for the agents Adam and Bob, against sample indifference curves. 
 
Notice the symmetry linking the above pair of formulas: one can obtain one from the other by 
substituting the parameters of agent A with the parameters of agent B and vice-versa. Thus, 
we recover the well-known fact that for CD agents the angular coefficients at the corners are 
reciprocal, as well as for any pair of points symmetric with respect to the diagonal x = 1 – y. 
Furthermore, as expected, ε (ε′ ) has no first order effect in the neighbourhood of the lower 
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(upper) corner, in that the preferences (1) approach the CD limit in the limit of vanishing y: in 
the limit in which the endowment of agent A is vanishing, his preferences approach the CD 
limit, and the slope of the Pareto set is determined by 
')1(
)'1(
aa
aa
−
−  and by the value of ε′. 
A natural question concerning the effects generated by ε and ε′ is as follows. Can we find 
WE allocations for CD agents which are invariant with respect to the action of interplay 
luxury effects? That is, does the Pareto set 
)1(
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yyx
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aaaa
−+
=
−
−
 
 for the CD agents a, 
a′ intersect the Pareto set (23) for the agents a, a′, ε, ε′ ? The answer is a positive one. 
 
LEMMA 2. For any pair of agents (1), the Pareto set (23) crosses the Pareto set 
)(~ ', yx aa for the CD agents a, a′. 
 
Proof. On account of Lemma 1, the derivative of the function (23) is larger than the derivative 
of )(~ ', yx aa in a neighbourhood of the lower corner, so that for small enough y the Pareto 
curve (23) lies above the curve )(~ ', yx aa . On the other hand, the derivative of (23) is larger 
than the derivative of )(~ ', yx aa in a neighbourhood of the upper corner as well, so that for y 
close enough to 1 the curve (25) lies below )(~ ', yx aa . Then, the two curves must intersect an 
odd number of times; in fact, it is not difficult to convince oneself that such intersection 
occurs at a single point, since the rational functions (23) display at most a pair of changes of 
concavity. 
 
 
Figure A5 displays an example of the phenomenon identified in Lemma 2. In fact, once the 
linear approximations to the Pareto set (23) are given at the corners, a qualitative description 
of its shape can be easily conjectured. In the limit of no effects, i.e. for a – a′ = ε  = ε′ = 0, one 
reduces to the straight Pareto set yyx =)(~ for identical CD agents. With respect to such 
benchmark cases, let us define region H of our boxes as the locus of points at which x > y, and 
region L for the opposite inequality. It has been long established (see for instance Mas-Colell 
et al., 1995, p. 533) that for homothetic consumers the Pareto set cannot intersect both regions 
H and L. Definitely, our model entails more structure, as established by 
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PROPOSITION 4. Pareto sets for our economies are characterized by distributive and 
luxury effects as follows. 
I) In the absence of effects, i.e. for a – a′ = ε  = ε′ = 0, the Pareto set coincides with 
the diagonal x = y.  
II) In the absence of luxury effects, i.e. for ε  = ε′ = 0, the Pareto set has definite 
convexity and lies entirely in region H for a > a′ and entirely in region L for a < 
a′. 
III) In the absence of interplay distributive effects and with individual luxury 
effects, i.e. 
 a – a′ = ε  = 0, ε′ > 0, or a – a′ = ε ′ = 0, ε  > 0, the Pareto set has no definite 
convexity and lies entirely in region H for ε′ > 0, and entirely in region L for ε > 
0. 
IV) In the absence of interplay distributive effects and with interplay luxury 
effects, i.e. 
 a – a′ = 0 and ε , ε′ > 0, the Pareto set has no definite convexity and intersects 
both regions H and L. 
V) In the general case the Pareto set has no definite convexity and may or may 
not lie entirely in one region. 
VI) If agents A and B are endowed with the same preferences, the Pareto curve is 
skew-symmetric with respect to the secondary diagonal x = 1 – y. 
 
Proof. All points can be checked directly via formula (23). In fact, by I) and II) we recover 
well known properties of CD exchange economies (largely employed in the theory of trade) 
represented in Figure A3. Point III) isolates individual luxury effects: with the help of (29) 
one envisions the effect of ε′ of increasing the slope of the Pareto curve about the lower 
corner above 45° so that the curve lies entirely in region H (Figure A4, upper). 
Correspondingly, ε increases the slope of the Pareto curve about the upper corner above 45°, 
so that the curve lies entirely in region L (Figure A4, lower). Point IV) is a consequence of 
Lemma 2, so that the Pareto set crosses the principal diagonal (Figure A5). Then, point V) 
enlarges the landscape to the general case, in which anything goes. To conclude, point VI) is 
an obvious symmetry requirement (Figure A6). 
 
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6    Conclusions 
It was the aim of the present contribution to employ a class of transcendental preferences for 
luxury in order to work out new solutions for competitive exchange equilibrium within the 
Edgeworth box. We have succeeded in computing Walrasian demand functions in both 
parametric and Cartesian forms, equilibrium prices and allocations, and then Pareto sets, in 
terms of simple combinations of elementary functions. Such transparent solutions enlighten 
the positive relevance of the luxury-necessity dichotomy in fixing up main features of well 
behaviour of exchange economies, in first instance, regularity, uniqueness of equilibrium and 
price tâtonnement stability. In fact, with the exception of the properties related to 
homotheticity, our economies retain the nice properties of Cobb-Douglas exchange 
economies. “For a theorist, the best of all possible worlds is one in which the social situation 
being analyzed can be formalized in a manner that, on the one hand, is very parsimonious [...] 
and, on the other hand, manages to predict a unique outcome” (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, p. 
590). Our economies seem to fit such requirements. The relevance of our model for empirical 
analysis may rest on the smooth Cobb-Douglas limit of our economies. 
Taking for granted the relevance of explicit solutions for general equilibrium 
models, we have been trying and enlighten the effectiveness of our solutions for 
exchange in providing transparent insights, which may complement standard 
technical perspectives in PTGE, with a sharp rationale for imposing structure on 
excess demand functions in terms of a luxury effect, along the lines discussed by 
Freixas and Mas-Colell (1987). In fact, the factor F(y) = exp(ε(1–a)y) generating the 
luxury effect in (1) can be employed in order to generate analogous effects with 
respect to any homothetic function, for instance CES14 models. Evidently, a natural 
generalization of the previous analysis can be obtained by enlarging the number of 
commodities subject to exchange; for instance one may inquire whether the 
conditions discussed by Freixas and Mas-Colell (1987) can be satisfied by suitable 
generalizations of the utility form (1). Noticeably, our model enables one to pair 
different agents, and consider any initial allocation (distribution of income). 
The transcendental utility functions we have employing belong to the class of King-
Plosser-Rebelo functions, which seem to represent a natural setting for the study of 
within-period labor supply as “an application of basic consumer theory” (Blundell 
and MaCurdy, 1999) to the representation of the leisure-consumption tradeoff; see 
Kimball and Shapiro (2008) and references therein. 
The pervasive role of the Edgeworth box as building block of equilibrium 
arguments makes it difficult to envision a preferred line of progress for our results. 
For sure, the analytical tractability of our model may be applied to the analysis of 
                                                 
14 Noticeably, CES preferences may lead to nonuniqueness of exchange equilibrium (Kehoe, 1998) 
ANDREA MANTOVI     On Luxury and Equilibrium 
 
 111
distortionary taxes (see for instance Kehoe, 1998) and market failures in general. 
Application of our Edgeworth boxes to mechanism design (for instance along the 
lines tailored by Hurwicz and Reiter, 2006) may prove relevant. In addition, our 
model may be employed as a workhorse in the inquiry about the ‘dark side’ of 
exchange tailored by Hirshleifer (1994), for which Anderton and Carter (2008) 
provide a recent contribution which confines to homothetic agents; by their 
tractability, our solutions may represent a workhorse in the analysis of the 
allocation of resources to the defence of goods offered for trade. 
Being the Edgeworth box an essential building block of the analysis of trade, applications 
of our explicit solution (23) for Pareto sets may pertain to factor allocations as shaped by the 
Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem, whose analysis is confined to homogeneous production 
functions. In addition, applications to the Rybczynski theorem and the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model of trade may represent interesting lines of inquiry. 
Noticeably, as for the objects of trade, according to Afriat (1987), “These need not always 
be commodities, or bear a market price, or even be of a material kind at all. There is trade in 
liberty, justice, simplicity, and in favours; it takes place also with nature, or technology, or 
whatever there are allowances under a constraint” (ivi, p. 93). Needless to say, liberty and 
justice stand out in such respects. To conclude, thus, it is tempting to conjecture possible 
applications of our model to the philosophy of law tailored by Ronald Dworkin15 (2000), and 
in particular to the consequences of the principle of equality of resources as a foundational 
perspective on liberal philosophy. The luxury-necessity dichotomy defines quite general a 
logic of choice, to the extent that we consider choices as bivariate and such that, as wealth 
increases, the rational allocation of resources shifts monotonically towards ‘luxury’ in its 
broader sense, beyond the, albeit relevant, purchase of goods (think for instance of rational 
individuals arguing about allocating their spare time). In Dworkin’s approach, economic 
mechanisms play a structural role, in first instance auctions and markets. “I argue that an 
equal division of resources presupposes an economic market of some form, mainly as an 
analytical device but also, to a certain extent, as an actual political institution” (ivi, p. 66). 
Possibly our model may represent a workhorse for the design of economic arguments, for 
which Edgeworth (1881) maintained that “He that will not verify his conclusions as far as 
possible by mathematics [...] will hardly realize the full value of what he holds” (ivi, p. 3). In 
such respects, the analytical tractability of our equilibrium model may well be taken as probe 
of its relevance. 
 
                                                 
15 The most original and powerful philosopher of law in the English speaking world, according to the 
obituary published by the Guardian, Thursday 14 February 2013. 
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Appendix. 
The present appendix collects a number of figures meant to sharpen the insights developed in 
the main text. Figure A1 represents the monotonicity of the luxury effect: other things (a, p 
and initial endowment) equal, ε drives an increase in utility for any y along budget lines, and 
therefore an increase in Marshallian demand for the luxury commodity. Figure A2 shows that 
a corresponding property does not hold for the effect driven by a. Figure A3 to A6 picture 
sample Pareto sets meant to represent the phenomenology established in Proposition 4. 
FigureA1 
 
 
Above. Plot of the function yaaa eyyypxyxpayf εε )1(1))((),,,,;( −−−−=  for 
a = 0.5, )2/1,2/1( == yx    , and p = 0.5. The monotonicity in y signals that the 
budget line is nowhere tangent to indifference curves. 
Below. Plot of the same function for p = 1. For given ε, argmaxy f 
corresponds to the unique point at which the budget line is tangent to an 
indifference curve. 
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Figure A2 
 
Plot of the function yaaa eyyypxyxpayf εε )1(1))((),,,,;( −−−−=  for ε = 0.5, 
)2/1,2/1( == yx    , and p = 0.5 (above) and p = 1 (below). 
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Figure A3 
 
Sample Pareto sets for our economies in the absence of luxury effects, for 
the CD agents (a, a’) = (0.2, 0.2; upper), (0.2, 0.5; middle), (0.6, 0.3, 0, 0; 
lower). 
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Figure A4 
 
Pareto sets for (a, a′, ε, ε′ ) = (0.2, 0.2, 4, 0; upper), (0.2, 0.2, 0, 6; lower). 
Figure A5 
 
The Pareto set )(~ 33.0,2.0 yx (concave curve) against the Pareto set for (a, a′,ε, 
ε′ ) = (0.2, 0.33, 5, 4). 
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Figure A.6 
 
The skew symmetric Pareto set for the identical agents (a, a′, ε, ε′ ) = (0.2, 
0.2, 4, 4). 
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